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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
“Crowdfunding” is the raising of small amounts of money from
many different sources for a particular purpose.1 Today, this usually takes
place online.2 Crowdfunding has become a popular means of raising funds
for a wide variety of projects, causes, and business ventures. Websites
like Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Crowdfunder allow people to create a
profile for their project and solicit contributions from the general public in
support.
[2]
As with online commercial activities in general, crowdfunding’s
emergence raises issues regarding data privacy and the protection of
personal information. For example, how should the government regulate
these websites? What information should these websites collect? Should
there be established safeguards to ensure the security of that information?

*

LL.M, Information Technology and Intellectual Property, University of Colorado Law
School. I would like to thank Professors Andrew Schwartz and Brad Bernthal at the
University of Colorado School of Law for their input on this topic. Special thanks go to
Professor Paul Ohm for his guidance and feedback.
1

See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012).
2

See id.; see also C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption:
Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 196 (2012) (“Crowdfunding is the use of the
Internet to raise money through small donations from a large number of people—the
‘crowd’ in crowdfunding.”).
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[3]
As this process has gained more popularity and attention, observers
have highlighted crowdfunding’s potential to support entrepreneurs, small
businesses, and startups that have historically struggled to raise the capital
they need to survive. However, Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) regulations have prohibited using crowdfunding to raise capital in
exchange for equity (i.e., ownership) in the respective business without
first registering with the SEC.3 Specifically, those regulations have
prohibited: 1) the “general solicitation” of investment;4 and 2) accepting
investments by anyone without considerable wealth (referred to as
“accredited investors”).5 “Hence, financing for fledgling firms is
generally obtained from the so-called ‘three Fs’: ‘family, friends, and
fools.’”6
[4]
In other words, individuals trying to start a business via
crowdfunding were dependent on donors’ pure generosity, or the offer of a
small reward (e.g., one of their products once the company got off the
ground). However strong these incentives may be, they are probably
weaker than the opportunity to share in the profits of the business if it is
successful. Accordingly, securities regulation prohibited many of these
emerging businesses from offering the strongest incentive through
crowdfunding—ownership.

3

See Bradford, supra note 1, at 42 (Offered securities “must be registered with the SEC
unless an exemption is available.”).
4

Id. at 46 (“Rule 506 prohibits ‘general solicitation’ and ‘general advertising’ of the
offering. The SEC and its staff take the position that any solicitation of an investor with
whom the issuer or its sales representatives do not have a preexisting relationship violates
the general solicitation restriction.”).
5

Id. (“Section 4(5) of the Securities Act . . . is similar to Rule 506. It allows offers and
sales solely to accredited investors provided that there is no ‘advertising or public
solicitation.’”); see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2013) (“The Securities Act has long exempted from its registration
requirement securities sold to the founder’s friends and relations, or unrelated wealthy
investors.”).
6

Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1461.

2
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[5]
President Obama believed equity crowdfunding could increase
capital formation if existing regulation allowed it, and signed the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act in April 2012. 7 Title II
allows businesses that are not registered with the SEC to publicly solicit
investment from wealthy “accredited investors.”8 Title III—the “Capital
Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure”
(“CROWDFUND”) Act—allows individual non-accredited investors to
invest limited amounts via crowdfunding websites.9 This new freedom,
however, does not go into effect until the SEC adopts implementing
regulations.10
[6]
The CROWDFUND Act is not an absolute green light for
crowdfunding investment. It places significant restrictions on the amounts
most people may invest based on their income and net worth. 11 The
crowdfunding platforms (e.g., websites) are responsible for making sure
7

See Press Release, The White House, President Obama To Sign Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act,
archived at http://perma.cc/JP7E-A96M (“The JOBS Act will allow Main Street small
businesses and high-growth enterprises to raise capital from investors more efficiently,
allowing small and young firms across the country to grow and hire faster.”).
8

See Usha Rodrigues, In Search of Safe Harbor: Suggestions for the New Rule 506(c), 66
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 29, 32 (2013).
9

See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1461–62 (“[T]he maximum annual aggregate amount of
crowdfunded securities that any one investor may purchase is limited based on a sliding
scale. If an investor’s net worth or annual income is under $100,000, she can invest the
greater of $2,000, or five percent of her annual income, in crowdfunded securities each
year. If her net worth or annual income is over $100,000, she can invest 10% of her
annual salary, capped at $100,000, per year.”).
10

See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking
Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 44 (2013) (The JOBS Act
provisions “will go into effect once the [SEC] promulgates rules and regulations to
govern the new marketplace for crowdfunded securities.”).
11

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012).

3
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that individual investors do not exceed those limitations, and the SEC is
required to make rules to help the websites meet that obligation. 12 Many
consider these limitations central to the regulatory structure envisioned by
the statute.13 Congress imposed the limits “to shield investors from losses
of devastating magnitude. It is practically impossible to lose one’s ‘life
savings’ in crowdfunding, no matter how unwise or unlucky one’s choices
may be.”14 Because the limitations are tied to investors’ income and net
worth, effective enforcement might require investors to disclose
significant personal information—including tax documents—
“to ensure that no investor . . . exceed[s] the investment limits . . . .”15
[7]
This requirement intensifies the privacy-related issues identified
above. While intrinsically related, “privacy” and data “security” are
separable concepts. Generally speaking, “privacy” issues concern what
information we disclose and what we keep to ourselves. “Security,” on
the other hand, refers to the ways our information is held and protected.
These concepts will be described and distinguished in greater detail below.
Centrally, the SEC—the agency tasked with constructing the applicable
rules—must balance ensuring enforcement of the investment caps with
investors’ privacy concern of releasing inherently personal information.
On a related note, the SEC must also make a security decision concerning
requirements “to protect the privacy of information collected from
investors . . . .”16
12

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012).

13

See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 10, at 59 (“The Act’s annual investment cap of $5,000
is a bedrock statutory protection for crowdfunding investors . . . so enforcing this limit
will be very important to the overall success of the Act.”); see also 158 CONG. REC.
S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-pt1PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN (stating that the investment
caps are “an important investor protection . . . for persons of lower income.”).
14

Schwartz, supra note 10, at 45.

15

15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012).

16

15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(9) (2012).
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[8]
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the crowdfunding
concept and its historical development. Part II introduces the JOBS Act
and its privacy-related implications. Part III describes the regulations the
SEC proposed to implement the JOBS Act. Part IV analyzes those
proposed regulations, analyzes their privacy and security treatment, and
recommends certain modifications.
II. CROWDFUNDING
A. What is Crowdfunding?
[9]
Fundamentally, “crowdfunding” is the raising of money for
particular projects from a wide range of sources.17 Today, the concept is
inextricably linked to the Internet.18 “Companies can pitch their company,
set a funding goal amount, and leverage the power of the Internet to raise
money through a large number of people (aka, the ‘crowd’).”19
B. History
[10] The concept behind crowdfunding is nothing new, and has actually
been used for centuries. Many people credit Jonathan Swift as the father
of the “microfinance” concept.20 Swift began making very small loans to
17

See Bradford, supra note 1, at 5.

18

See id.; see also Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding And How Does It Benefit the
Economy, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-howdoes-it-benefit-the-economy/, archived at http://perma.cc/XC74-MA2B.
19

About Crowdfunding, STARTUPVALLEY, http://www.startupvalley.com/moreinfo/aboutcrowdfunding.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/XU5G-CBR6 (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
20

See, e.g., Was Crowd Funding Really Invented In Ireland?, LINKED FINANCE (Feb. 10,
2013), https://linkedfinance.wordpress.com/2013/02/10/was-crowd-funding-reallyinvented-in-ireland/, archived at https://perma.cc/J8S7-WSS8; see also About
Crowdfunding, supra note 19 (“Crowdfunding can be traced as far back as the 1700s. An
idea we now call Microfinancing, was started by Jonathan Swift in Ireland. Here, Swift

5
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tradesmen who had fallen on hard times but was nevertheless good in the
community.21 The German publishing practice of “Praenumeration” is
another 18th century example of the general crowdfunding concept.22 In
other words, publishers offered a small reward to a group of donors in
exchange for their financial support. Crowdfunding also helped Joseph
Pulitzer get the Statue of Liberty to the United States.23
C. Contemporary Uses
[11] As noted above, crowdfunding has become associated with the
Internet. That progression was probably predictable given the exposure
opportunities the Internet can provide. Raising money from a crowd of
people will likely be more successful, all other things being equal, the
bigger the “crowd” becomes. In that sense, the Internet was practically
made for the development of crowdfunding. Individuals and businesses
are using crowdfunding to finance a staggering array of activities on
almost countless websites.24 These efforts include:
began a fund that gave loans to low-income families throughout Ireland.”); M. Ibberson,
Time For A History Lesson: The Evolution Of Crowdfunding, CROWDCLAN BLOG (Aug.
22, 2013), http://www.crowdclan.com/time-for-a-history-lesson-the-evolution-ofcrowdfunding/, archived at http://perma.cc/9NHP-9ZAM (“You could say the evolution
of crowdfunding started in the 1700s, a man by the name of Jonathan Swift created the
Irish Loan Fund for low-income families.”).
21

See LINKED FINANCE, supra note 20 (The Irish Loan Fund provided “loans to lowincome rural-based families who had no credit history and little collateral but were
considered creditworthy.”).
22

See Praenumeration, ENCYCLO.CO.UK,
http://www.encyclo.co.uk/define/Praenumeration, archived at http://perma.cc/45Y52N7D (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (relating that book publishers “offered to sell a book
that was planned but had not yet been printed, usually at a discount, so as to cover their
costs in advance.”).
23

See Statue of Liberty, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/307 (last visited Jan. 21, 2015); Statue Of Liberty: PulitzerIn Depth, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/stli/historyculture/pulitzer-indepth.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/5WHU-LNLS (last updated Jan. 21, 2015).

6
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Medical expenses;
Charitable causes (e.g., natural disaster relief);
College financing;
Artistic endeavors (e.g., film production, recording projects,
and book publication);
Food (e.g., restaurants, food trucks, and edible goods); and
Technology startups.

D. Surge
[12] These activities have recently exploded.
In 2012, global
25
crowdfunding increased eighty-one percent from 2011. “Overall, crowd
funding platforms raised $2.7 billion worldwide in 2012, a figure expected
to hit $5.1 billion this year . . . .”26 Websites facilitating crowdfunding
have proliferated as well. “According to industry estimates, there are
currently over 500 active crowdfunding platforms—some sources have
quoted 9,000 registered domain names related to crowdfunding.”27

24

See, e.g., Ryan Caldbeck, Crowdfunding Trends: Which Crowdfunding Sites Will
Survive, FORBES (June 23, 2013, 6:40 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2013/06/23/crowdfunding-trends-whichcrowdfunding-sites-will-survive/, archived at http://perma.cc/QFE3-HHLD (As of June
23, 2013, “[a]ccording to industry estimates, there are . . . over 500 active crowdfunding
platforms [and] some sources have quoted 9,000 registered domain names related to
crowdfunding.”).
25

See Kylie MacLellan, Global Crowdfunding Volumes Rise 81 Percent in 2012,
REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/uscrowdfunding-data-idUSBRE9370QY20130408, archived at http://perma.cc/R4BC8PWX.
26

Arlene Weintraub, Find Money for College on Crowd Funding Sites, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Sept. 20, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/bestcolleges/paying-for-college/articles/2013/09/20/find-money-for-college-on-crowdfunding-sites, archived at http://perma.cc/3NDF-NRKZ.
27

Caldbeck, supra note 24.
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III. JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS (“JOBS”) ACT
[13] The remainder of this paper is about a balance between competing
investor concerns. In the JOBS Act, Congress decided to employ
crowdfunding as a tool to trigger the national economy. But in doing so, it
imposed investment limits to protect investors from severe economic
damage caused by bad investments. The SEC is tasked with creating
regulations that enforce these limitations while also facilitating capital
formation. In carrying out those responsibilities, the SEC seems to have
seriously undermined those protections by failing to require the
information disclosures necessary to make them effective. That decision,
however, might protect investors in other ways, namely by promoting their
privacy interests by limiting the amount and sensitivity of information
investors must provide to crowdfunding intermediaries before they may
participate.
[14] Without necessarily even trying, the SEC might have actually
struck the proper balance. There is evidence that the small entities that are
likely to drive crowdfunding are particularly vulnerable to the data
breaches we have seen of late. There are also few legal restrictions on
how these intermediaries may use the information they collect from
investors. The rise in data brokers, and the relative lack of attention they
have received, might also support limiting the information investors must
provide. Finally, the actual limits Congress set seem generally arbitrary.
That is, there is little indication that these amounts are necessary or
narrowly tailored to prevent the sort of harm envisioned. In that case, the
limits might not be worth enforcing.
[15] Having introduced the crowdfunding concept, Section III of this
paper describes how Congress and the President sought to harness its
potential, and the information privacy issues that created. The JOBS Act
sought to ease the impact of traditional securities regulation that
significantly constrained crowdfunding as a means of raising capital.
Congress, however, was also concerned that unsophisticated investors
could lose devastating amounts of money if left to their own devices in the
crowdfunding marketplace. As a result, it chose to limit annual
8
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investments to levels it considered safe based on individual investors’
income and/or net worth.
A. Need
[16] The White House, along with many others, describes small
businesses as “the engines of job creation and essential to strengthening
our national economy.”28 As a result, helping them start, survive, and
grow is a policy priority,29 and freeing capital for small businesses is a key
component of that policy priority. Many people have also touted
crowdfunding as a potentially powerful means of accomplishing this
objective.30
Two components of traditional securities regulation
concerning registration and investor qualifications precluded businesses
from using crowdfunding to raise capital in exchange for ownership of
their venture.31 The following two subsections describe these regulations
and their practical effects.

28

Supporting Small Businesses, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/business/small-business, archived at
http://perma.cc/KF24-LCNM (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
29

See, e.g., Chairman Steve Chabot, Access to Capital, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL
BUSINESS, http://smallbusiness.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=5958, archived at
http://perma.cc/RY5P-P7QX (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (acknowledging that “[o]ne of
the biggest issues faced by small businesses is the inability to access sufficient credit and
capital.”).
30

See, e.g., The White House, supra note 7 (The JOBS Act “will help growing businesses
access financing while maintaining investor protections . . . in several ways . . . .”
including through crowdfunding.); Eric Markowitz, Why the Crowdfunding Bill is Good
for Start-ups, INC., http://www.inc.com/articles/201112/why-the-crowdfundinglegislation-is-good-for-start-ups.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2XC8-HPLM (last
updated Dec. 8, 2011) (quoting Sen. Scott Brown describing crowdfunding as “the grease
that keeps the gears in the American economy churning.”); Prive, supra note 18 (“In a
seemingly nonstop recession wave, small businesses are struggling more than ever to stay
afloat, and entrepreneurs are not facing great odds. Crowdfunding offers these
individuals a chance at success, by showcasing their businesses and projects to the entire
world.”).

9
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1. Traditional Regulation
[17] “The Securities Act of 1933 . . . as amended, requires that any
offer or sale of securities be registered with the [SEC] unless there is an
exemption available.”32 Securities include “any . . . certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement . . . transferable share,
investment contract . . . [and] any instrument commonly known as a
‘security’ . . . .”33 “The term . . . is broadly defined to include many
instruments that might be bought or sold for investment.”34
[18] The registration requirement has restricted crowdfunding’s
potential to provide entrepreneurs, small businesses and startups with
additional capital they need in two ways. First, businesses generally had
to register with the SEC before it could offer a “security” to the public.35
The registration process alone is extremely expensive, and then the
company had to pay for the actual solicitation of investment.36 Second,
31

See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249) (“Limitations under existing regulations,
including restrictions on general solicitation and general advertising and purchaser
qualification requirements, have made private placement exemptions generally
unavailable for crowdfunding transactions, which are intended to be made to a large
number of potential investors and not limited to investors that meet specific
qualifications.”)
32

Douglas S. Ellenoff, Making Crowdfunding Credible, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 19,
19 (2013); see also Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 31 (“Securities law requires companies to
register the offer or sale of their shares with the SEC prior to sale, unless they can find an
exemption from registration.”).
33

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012).

34

14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 6833 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2012).
35

See Bradford, supra note 1, at 6 (“[S]ecurities offerings must be registered under the
Securities Act of 1933 . . . unless an exemption is available.”).
36

See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1468.

10
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outside of friends and family, SEC Regulation D generally only allowed
businesses to accept investment from wealthy individuals and entities,
known as “accredited investors.”37 As applied to natural persons,
“accredited investor[s]” are generally those with a net worth of $1 million,
or who made more than $200,000 in each of the previous two years.38
2. Restrictions Caused by the Traditional Regulatory
Structure
[19] Traditionally, based on these regulations, you had two choices.
You could cough up a ton of cash, and then offer ownership in your
company to non-friends or family in exchange for investment.39 Or, you
could skip the substantial expense of SEC registration, but you could only
sell ownership in the company to friends, family, and incredibly rich
people (or entities like venture capital firms).40
[20] Forcing startups, small businesses, and entrepreneurs to make this
choice had predictable consequences. Most young businesses simply

37

See id. at 1467–68; see also Devin Thorpe, SEC Issues New Regulations for
Crowdfunding; Panel Comments Live, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:13 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2013/10/24/sec-issues-new-regs-forcrowdfunding-panel-comments-live/, archived at perma.cc/5AS7-94V9 (“Limits are set
by the Act on the amount of money non-accredited (those without a million-dollar net
worth excluding their home or without a $200,000 personal income) investors may
invest.”).
38

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2014) (Marital status can affect these threshold
amounts).
39

See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1466 (“The federal securities laws require that stocks,
bonds, or other securities be registered with the SEC before being offered for sale to the
public.”).
40

See id. at 1461 (“The Securities Act has long exempted from its registration
requirement securities sold to the founder’s friends and relations, or unrelated wealthy
investors.”).

11
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cannot afford to go through the SEC registration process. 41 The SEC cited
commentary it received from interested parties arguing:
[T]hat registered offerings are not feasible for raising
smaller amounts of capital, as is done in a typical
crowdfunding transaction, because of the costs of
conducting a registered offering and the resulting ongoing
reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 . . . that may arise as a result of the offering.42
As a result, they are not allowed to raise funds by selling ownership in
their business except to friends, family, and the wealthy accredited
investors like angel investors and venture capitalists. Unfortunately, most
emerging business owners do not have the good fortune of a wealthy
friend or family member willing to bankroll their entrepreneurial
ventures.43 Similarly, an incredibly small percentage successfully raise
funds from venture capital.44 Worse still, startups and entrepreneurs
received less in loans in 2011 than they did in 2008 in the depths of the
financial crisis.45

41

See id. at 1467 (“[T]oday, the process of going public costs millions of dollars in legal,
accounting, and other fees and, in a potentially related development, the number of
companies electing to do so has shrunk to an all-time low.”).
42

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429.

43

See Bradford, supra note 1, at 5.

44

See id.; see also Bradford, supra note 2, at 196 (“Traditional sources of business
financing—bank lending, venture capital, and angel investors—are unavailable to many
startups and other very small offerings.”).
45

See Tanya Prive, Inside the JOBS Act: Equity Crowdfunding, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2012,
11:57 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/06/inside-the-jobs-actequity-crowdfunding-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/S56T-J6VY.

12
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B. Provisions
[21] The JOBS Act intended to ease those restrictions and make equity
crowdfunding a viable source of capital for small and emerging
businesses.46 With that goal in mind, the JOBS Act allows businesses to:
1) “solicit” investment (but only accept money from the rich accredited
investors);47 and 2) accept limited investment from unaccredited
investors.48 The statute “seeks to more intelligently align capital
formation with the way modern society operates and interacts on a daily
basis.”49 The following subsections explain the important crowdfunding
actors, and describe the actual provisions and goals of the JOBS Act.

46

See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429 (“The crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS
Act were designed to help provide startups and small businesses with capital by making
relatively low dollar offerings of securities less costly.”); see also James J. Williamson,
Comment, The JOBS Act and Middle-Income Investors: Why it Doesn’t Go Far Enough,
122 YALE L.J. 2069, 2071 (2013) (“The JOBS Act was designed to allow a wider class of
Americans to invest in start-ups.”); National Crowdfunding Association, National
Crowdfunding Association Welcomes SEC’s Proposed Investment Crowdfunding Rules,
PR NEWSWIRE SERVICES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/national-crowdfunding-association-welcomes-secs-proposed-investmentcrowdfunding-rules-229027541.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GP6T-494U (“As
[SEC] Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher stated . . . ‘In Title III of the JOBS Act,
Congress recognized the potential of the Internet to facilitate capital formation for very
small companies at a critical stage of their growth.’”).
47

See Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide To General Solicitation And Title II of
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-togeneral-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/, archived at http://perma.cc/M7JD-G5ZZ
(“Only accredited investors can actually invest in fundraising rounds where companies
generally solicit . . . .”).
48

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).

49

Ellenoff, supra note 32, at 19.

13
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1. Terms
[22] The three primary actors in the equity crowdfunding process are:
1) issuers; 2) investors; and 3) intermediaries. An “issuer,” generally
speaking, is any “person who issues or proposes to issue any security . . .
.”50 In the crowdfunding context, these are the companies offering
ownership in exchange for investment.51 Investors are simply the people
purchasing ownership in the crowdfunded businesses (i.e., the “crowd”).
[23] Financial intermediaries are the middlemen who actually facilitate
the sale of crowdfunded securities to investors.52 They will serve the same
general function that non-equity crowdfunding sites like Kickstarter
currently perform. Under the statute, intermediaries may operate as either
a “broker” or “funding portal.”53 “[A] third party that operates a Web site
to effect the purchase and sale of securities for the account of others
generally would, under existing regulations, be required to register with
the [SEC] as a broker-dealer and comply with the laws and regulations
applicable to broker-dealers.”54
[24] At the same time, “[a] person that operates such a Web site only
for the purchase of securities of startups and small businesses . . . may find
it impractical in view of the limited nature of that person’s activities and
business to register as a broker-dealer and operate under the full set of
regulatory obligations that apply . . . .”55 Accordingly, the statute provided

50

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2012).

51

See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 48.

52

See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1462.

53

15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1) (2012).

54

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249).
55

Id.
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for a second subcategory of intermediaries called “funding portal[s],”56
which will “be subject to a new regulatory regime . . . established by SEC
rulemaking.”57 Funding portals do not have “to register with the [SEC] as
brokers,”58 but may not engage in certain activities.59
2. Title III—CROWDFUND Act
[25] The CROWDFUND Act sought to make crowdfunding a viable
means of raising capital without abandoning the investor protections that
formed the traditional foundation of securities regulation. This component
of the JOBS Act “provides an exemption from the registration
requirements of Securities Act Section 5 for certain crowdfunding
transactions.”60 But it also imposed investment limits intended to protect
investors from catastrophic financial harm. These investment limits—and
56

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1) (2012); Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430
(“[T]ransactions must be conducted through an intermediary that either is registered as a
broker or is registered as a new type of entity called a ‘funding portal.’”).
57

Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1462.

58

Crowdfunding 101, NATIONAL CROWDFUNDING ASSOCIATION,
http://www.nlcfa.org/crowdfund-101.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RR38-94T5 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015).
59

See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012) (A “funding portal” is a crowdfunding intermediary
“that does not[:] (A) offer investment advice or recommendations; (B) solicit purchases,
sales, or offers to buy the securities offered or displayed on its website or portal; (C)
compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale
of securities displayed or referenced on its website or portal; (D) hold, manage, possess,
or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; or (E) engage in such other activities as
the Commission, by rule, determines appropriate.”); see also U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Division of Trading and Markets, Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act: Frequently Asked Questions About Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 7, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tmjobsact-crowdfundingintermediariesfaq.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/NWV2-PGR7.
60

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430.
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more particularly their enforcement—create the privacy and security
issues that could affect the underlying goal of facilitating capital
formation. The limits cannot be enforced without requiring investors to
disclose significant personal information. The greater the required
disclosures, the more investors’ privacy interests will be sacrificed.
Investors may also shy away from investing through a crowdfunding
platform if they have to document things like their income and/or net
worth.
[26] The law allows companies to raise up to $1 million per year in
exchange for ownership in the business through crowdfunding.61 Investing
in a startup, however, is risky.62 The majority of these businesses fail, so
“much of the money given to [them] ends up being lost.”63 In fact,
“[a]bout three quarters of venture-backed firms in the U.S. don’t return
investors’ capital . . . .”64
[27] Many also “worr[ied] . . . that inexperienced investors would be
much more vulnerable to fraud [and] when one looks at the prospect of
investment-based crowdfunding, the potential for fraud . . . is still a scary

61

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012) (establishing an exemption for “transactions
involving the offer or sale of securities . . . provided that . . . the aggregate amount sold to
all investors by the issuer . . . during the 12-month period preceding the date of such
transaction . . . is not more than $1,000,000 . . . .”); see also Schwartz, supra note 10, at
48.
62

See Timothy Spangler, Is Crowdfunding Good for Investors?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct.
30, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/10/is-crowdfundinggood-for-investors, archived at http://perma.cc/NKA4-AXZL (“There’s another problem
that has gotten less attention, but is likely to be much more common: most startups fail.”).
63

Id.

64

Id. (citing Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL
ST. J., available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190
, archived at http://perma.cc/DTB7-XMQM (last updated Sept. 20, 2012, 12:01
AM)(quoting Shikar Ghosh)).
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idea.”65 In comments to the SEC, William A. Jacobson—Director of the
Cornell Securities Law Clinic—noted that:
The potential or fraud and negligent misrepresentation in
crowdfunding is high. The safeguards and regulatory
scrutiny found in registered public offerings are more
stringent than what is provided under Regulation
Crowdfunding, leaving investors to make decisions with
information that is less complete and less vetted. These
investors may not have the experience to recognize unusual
or outlandish claims and will be less likely to pay for due
diligence than wealthier investors negotiating large
investments in private equity offerings.66
Some have suggested that lowering the regulatory burdens to allow equity
crowdfunding “will very nearly legalize fraud in the stock market.” 67
Regulators were also skeptical that crowdfunding investors would be able

65

Diogo Mourato, Investment Based Crowdfunding & The Knot in Your Stomach, DAILY
CROWDSOURCE, http://dailycrowdsource.com/content/crowdfunding/1042-5-reasons-toworry-about-investment-based-crowdfunding, archived at http://perma.cc/38FS-CPAF
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
66

Letter from William A. Jacobson, Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Sec. Law Clinic,
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, United States Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 9 (Feb. 3, 2014),
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-219.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/P4R8-HAC2.
67

Matt Taibbi, Why Obama’s JOBS Act Couldn’t Suck Worse, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 9,
2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/why-obamas-jobs-actcouldnt-suck-worse-20120409, archived at http://perma.cc/D4VY-GPJD; see also Jesse
Hamilton & Phil Mattingly, Job-Creation Bill Seen Eviscerating U.S. Shareholder
Protections, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-13/job-creation-legislation-seen-evisceratingshareholder-protections-in-u-s-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/88FS-78DF (“U.S.
legislation that would roll back securities disclosure and governance rules in the name of
job creation is being attacked by consumer advocates and former regulators as an
evisceration of investor protections in place since the 1930s.”).
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to appreciate these risks.
William Galvin, Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, explained:
Longstanding problems in the markets for small and
speculative stocks show the pitfalls of relying on the
wisdom of crowds. It is clearly possible to deceive large
groups of investors, and it is definitely possible for fraud
operators to swindle individuals. Unscrupulous penny
stock promoters have used misrepresentations to market
obscure and low-value stocks to individuals, often through
pump and dump schemes.68
As a result, some controls were necessary to minimize crowdfunding
investors’ financial exposure.
[28] To minimize the inherent risk of betting on a stranger’s business
idea on the Internet, Congress limited the amount each individual may
invest via crowdfunding each year according to his or her income or net
worth.69 For example, people who make less than $100,000 per year, or
are worth less than $100,000, may invest $2,000 or five percent of their
income or net worth, whichever is more.70 Individuals who make, or are
worth, more than $100,000 per year may invest ten percent of their annual
income or $100,000, whichever is more.71
68

Comment by William F. Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on
SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act: Title III, Crowdfunding, at 1 (Aug. 8,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-121.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/SC73-CWZH.
69

See 158 CONG. REC. S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-pt1PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN; see also Schwartz, supra note
10, at 45 (“Congress also included an innovative structural protection for investors,
specifically a strict annual cap on the aggregate amount that a person may invest in any
and all crowdfunded securities.”).
70

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012).

71

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii) (2012).
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[29] The concrete underpinnings of the investment limits Congress
chose are unclear. Senator Jeff Merkley, an active crowdfunding
proponent, explained that “[w]ithout aggregate caps, someone could in
theory . . . unintentionally wip[e] out their entire savings.”72 The
intermediaries are responsible for ensuring that investors do not exceed
these limits by following rules the SEC will set.73 Intermediaries must
“take such steps to protect the privacy of information collected from
investors as the [SEC] shall, by rule, determine appropriate.”74
[30] Issuers may not sell equity in their business directly to investors.
Instead, “[t]he Act requires that all crowdfunded transactions be
completed using a registered portal or broker-dealer.”75 These entities
must “[r]egister with the SEC and [the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority] as either a portal or a broker-dealer.”76 Subsection D discusses
the implication of privacy interests under the JOBS Act and the ways in
which the SEC’s regulations might address those implications.
C. Privacy Complications
1. Privacy vs. Security
[31] The first information issue confronting the SEC (i.e., determining
what personal information should be disclosed to facilitate crowdfunding)
is a “privacy” problem. The second (i.e., how that information must be
collected, stored, and managed) relates to security. While the two
72

158 CONG. REC. S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-pt1PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN.
73

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012).

74

15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(9) (2012).

75

Thorpe, supra note 37.

76

Id.
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concepts are frequently intertwined, “privacy” and “security” are actually
distinct.77 “Privacy” refers to a “normative framework for deciding who
should legitimately have the capability to access and alter information. 78
“Security,” on the other hand, describes “the set of technological
mechanisms (including, at times, physical ones) that mediates requests for
access or control.”79 In other words, privacy and security are intertwined
as “[s]ecurity implements [our privacy] choices.”80
[32] These issues relate to, and affect, one another.81 For example,
“[d]ifferent security architectures make privacy regimes more or less
77

See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
667, 668–69 (2013); see also Leigh Nakanishi, The Difference Between Security and
Privacy and Why We Must Better Communicate About Both, EDELMAN (Oct. 20, 2011),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130217100622/http://datasecurity.edelman.com/thedifference-between-security-and-privacy-and-why-we-must-better-communicate-aboutboth/, archived at https://perma.cc/WVC3-6HVL (“[I]n order to really understand and
effectively communicate about these issues, it’s important to understand or think of them
as two separate but related issues.”) (accessed by searching for
http://datasecurity.edelman.com/the-difference-between-security-and-privacy-and-whywe-must-better-communicate-about-both/ in the Internet Archive Wayback Machine).
78

See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 77, at 669; see also Nakanishi, supra note 77 (“Privacy
is about governance and use. More specifically, making sure the policies and rules are in
place to ensure that information is being collected, shared and used in appropriate
ways.”).
79

Bambauer, supra note 77, at 669; see also Nakanishi, supra note 77 (“Security and
cybersecurity is about protection. More specifically, it addresses how information is
being protected from malicious actors and other unwanted parties who are trying to
exploit it for a variety of motives from profit to espionage.”).
80

Bambauer, supra note 77, at 669.

81

See, e.g., id. at 677; see also Brian Anderson, The Difference Between Data Privacy
and Data Security, EIQBLOG (Sept. 9, 2013, 5:55 AM),
http://blog.eiqnetworks.com/blog/bid/313892/The-Difference-Between-Data-Privacyand-Data-Security, archived at http://perma.cc/C39D-AFNF (“Although data privacy and
data security are often used as synonyms, they share more of a symbiotic type of
relationship.”).
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tenable, thereby influencing their development and adoption.”82 In the
crowdfunding context, the viability of the SEC’s security policies could
(and probably should) impact what information it requires investors to
disclose. Moreover, the SEC’s decisions concerning privacy and security
have the potential to promote or undermine the statutory goal of
facilitating capital formation startup financing. Sacrificing some privacy
(i.e., requiring investors to disclose more personal information) could chill
investment by making the process more onerous and/or invasive.
Effective security within each crowdfunding platform is essential to the
credibility of this unfamiliar means of investment. Investors will not invest
if they believe the information they provide is insecure. If investors do not
invest via crowdfunding platforms, then legalizing it will have little
impact. Neither security nor privacy issues related to equity crowdfunding
have received significant attention, but both can affect the success of the
JOBS Act, perhaps significantly.
2. Enforcement of Investment Limits
[33] The CROWDFUND Act creates potential conflict between
investors’ privacy interests and the fundamental goals of the statute (i.e.,
increasing access to capital for small businesses and startups by making
investment easier for more people). Congress chose to allow equity
crowdfunding, but also imposed limits on the amount individuals could
invest.83 Bypassing income verification “could turn [equity crowdfunding]
into a casino with more losers than winners.”84 While generally supportive
of a light regulatory approach, Professor Andrew Schwartz explains that
“[t]he Act’s annual investment cap . . . is a bedrock statutory protection for

82

Bambauer, supra note 77, at 677.

83

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012).

84

John Wasik, Crowdfunding Rule Could Set Dangerous Precedent, FORBES (Oct. 21,
2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2013/10/21/crowdfunding-rulecould-set-dangerous-precedent/, archived at http://perma.cc/URB9-P6ZW.
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crowdfunding investors . . . so enforcing this limit will be very important
to the overall success of the Act.”85
[34] The desire for caps was probably motivated, in part, by recent
economic catastrophes involving overextended investors and those who
take advantage of them.86 While protecting investors from economic
destruction is a noble goal, the precise caps in the statute may not be well
tailored to that objective. The limits proposed in Congress varied widely
from $1,000 to $10,000 per person.87 It is unclear why $1,000 is not
enough, $10,000 is too much, but $2,000 to $5,000 is generally an
appropriate amount of risk for most investors. For that matter, why should
Congress limit crowdfunding investment to $2,000 per year when anyone
can buy as many lottery tickets as they can afford? 88 Furthermore,
effective enforcement of these limits would likely require investors to
85

Schwartz, supra note 10, at 59.

86

See, e.g., Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 125, 128 (2009)
(quoting Robert Shiller, Definition of Irrational Exuberance, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE,
http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/definition.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/P8JJRN8Z (last visited Jan. 21, 2015)) (“The one essential cause of the housing bubble was
irrational exuberance,” defined as “a heightened state of speculative fervor.”); see also
Brian Farnkoff, Crowdfunding for Biotechs: How the SEC’s Proposed Rule May
Undermine Capital Formation for Startups, 30 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131,
174–75 (2013) (discussing the causes of the mortgage crisis and parallel concerns
motivating investor protections in the crowdfunding context).
87

See Barb Darrow, Senator Brown: The Time to Act on Crowdfunding Bill Is Now,
GIGAOM (Mar. 5, 2012, 9:11 AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/03/05/senator-brown-thetime-to-act-on-crowdsourcing-bill-is-now/, archived at http://perma.cc/7RMV-8PUQ.
88

See Andrew Farquharson, Andrew Farquharson: More of a Hindrance than Help,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2013/11/27/andrew-farquharson-more-of-a-hindrancethan-help/, archived at http://perma.cc/C92T-U3Z7 (“Individuals can . . . invest in tickets
for the state lottery, with no protection from the government. So why not allow average
citizens to have investment access to opportunities that have traditionally been reserved
for the wealthy?”).
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disclose significant personal information to the intermediaries. Thus, the
CROWDFUND Act raises an important privacy-related question for the
SEC to answer. Namely, what information should investors disclose to
facilitate enforcement of the statutory investment limits?89 If the specific
limits are poorly drawn, should the SEC sacrifice investor privacy and
easy capital formation to facilitate their enforcement?
[35] Consider two possible regulatory approaches to illustrate the
tension between actual enforcement and privacy. The SEC could allow
intermediaries to rely on investors to simply report their income or net
worth. The House of Representatives version of the JOBS Act actually
took this approach, allowing intermediaries to “rely on certifications as to
annual income provided by the person to whom the securities are sold to
verify the investor’s income.”90 That would protect investors’ privacy by
allowing them to invest without disclosing documentary proof of their
income like tax returns. However, it would fall far short of “ensur[ing]
that no investor . . . has purchased crowdfunded securities that” exceed the
statutory caps because investors could very simply lie.91 That is possibly
troubling given that individuals could invest more by reporting more
income or net worth. This approach does little to address the incentive
investors have to provide inaccurate information.
[36] Alternatively, the SEC could impose significant obligations on
intermediaries—and investors, for that matter—to make sure individual
investors do not exceed their investment limits. In the context of
investment solicitation and establishing accreditation, “[u]ntil now,
investors have ‘self-certified’ that they qualify for accedited [sic] status.
However, the new SEC regulations will require some to start handing over
personal financial information, like tax returns, to prove their net worth [or
89

See Bradford, supra note 2, at 202 (“It [was] unclear what the SEC will require
intermediaries to do to enforce this aggregate limit.”).
90

H.R. Res. 3606, 112th Cong. § 4A(c) (as passed by House, Apr. 5, 2012) (enacted); see
also Farnkoff, supra note 86, at 164.
91

Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012)).
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income].”92 Under this approach, the SEC could require intermediaries to
collect tax returns and/or bank statements and verify the investor’s income
and/or net worth, and that their investments do not exceed the cap.
[37] Congress and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau have
required this sort of scrutiny in the mortgage context.93 Creditors
providing mortgage loans must make “a reasonable and good faith
determination based on verified and documented information that . . . the
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan . . . .”94 In making that
determination, the creditor should collect and analyze “the consumer’s
Internal Revenue Service Form W–2, tax returns, payroll receipts,
financial institution records, or other third-party documents that provide
reasonably reliable evidence of the consumer’s income or assets.”95
[38] Taking a similar approach to enforce crowdfunding limits would
clearly implicate investors’ privacy interests to a greater degree, but it
might also facilitate enforcement of the investment caps that Congress
thought were so important to protecting investors. At the same time, this
92

J.D. Harrison, Can Crowdfunding Fill Stock Market’s ‘Black Hole’ for Startups and
Small Businesses?, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-26/business/41447075_1_black-hole-stockmarket-most-firms, archived at http://perma.cc/5YVT-CB7C.
93

See What Is the Ability-to-Repay Rule? Why Is It Important to me?, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1787/what-abilityrepay-rule-why-it-important-me.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4QH9-ZXKJ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015) (“Congress responded [to housing contributions to the financial
crisis] by passing a common-sense law that says mortgage lenders must make a
reasonable effort to figure out if a borrower has the ability to repay the mortgage before
the loan is made. The CFPB is responsible for enforcing this law, and we have written
a rule that says lenders have to make a reasonable and good-faith effort to figure out a
borrower’s ability to repay a mortgage. In practice this means lenders must generally
find out, consider, and document a borrower’s income, assets, employment, credit history
and monthly expenses.”).
94

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2012).

95

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4) (2012).
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approach could undermine perhaps the most fundamental purpose of the
CROWDFUND Act—making it easier for individuals to invest and
businesses to raise capital. Some investors would very likely forego the
opportunity to invest instead of gathering and disclosing this sort of
documentation, and intermediaries would face additional burdens
associated with collecting and scrutinizing the data.
[39] Disconnect among intermediaries could make it extremely difficult
to enforce the “aggregate” investment limits set forth in 15 U.S.C. §
77d(a)(6)(B).96 “The intermediary’s records will show how much each
investor has purchased through its site, but investors might also have
purchased [crowdfunded securities] on other sites.”97 Once again, “[t]he
intermediary could ask the investor how much he has invested on other
crowdfunding sites, but the answer might be intentionally or
unintentionally incorrect.”98 Professor Andrew Schwartz identified even
less sinister ways that self-verification could defeat enforcement of the
investment caps:
It may not be enough, for instance, for intermediaries to
simply ask investors whether they have reached their
annual limit and leave it at that, as crowdfunding investors
might not remember or keep records of their past
investments. Nor can intermediaries rely solely on their
own internal records, as the cap is an aggregate one for all
crowdfunding securities purchased on any platform and
from any issuer.99
96

See 15 U.S.C. 77d(a)(6)(B).

97

Bradford, supra note 2, at 202.

98

Id.

99

Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60; see also Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, North
Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3
(Feb. 3, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-286.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/PL4Y-72JP (“First, it is not clear that retail investors will be
keeping careful tabs on their individual investment amounts. Given the relatively small
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In other words, relying on investors to verify their investment suffers from
the same flaws as relying on self-verification of income and net worth.
[40] Accordingly, the SEC faces something of a catch-22. Senator Jeff
Merkley, one of the JOBS Act’s Senate cosponsors, described two goals in
creating the crowdfunding provisions. First, the drafters sought to
“enable[e] [the crowdfunding] market to work for startups and small
businesses . . . .”100 Second, they focused on “protecting ordinary
investors from fraud and deception.”101 As suggested, these two
objectives might conflict with each other. The investor protections
implemented by Congress (i.e., investment limits) require information
from investors to be effective. Mark Cuban and others, however, have
expressed skepticism that people will sacrifice certain personal
information in order to invest.102 Furthermore, enforcing the investment
limits may not justify sacrificing investors’ privacy and the statutory goal
of capital formation if the limits are arbitrarily drawn or only loosely
connected to protecting investors. Achieving the statutory goals requires
“smart, effective rules and consistent, conscientious oversight by the . . .
SEC . . . and the State securities regulators.”103

investment amounts commonly sought in crowdfunding deals, as low as a single $1
investment in many instances, it would be fairly easy for an active crowdfunding investor
to lose track. Second, investors may miscalculate their net income or net worth—for
example, an investor could easily assume that net worth includes the value of his or her
principal place of business. Without some form of independent, third-party check, there
is a significant likelihood that investors, by accident or design, will not report accurate
amounts and ultimately exceed statutory limits.”).
100

158 CONG. REC. S5475 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26pt1-PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN.
101

Id.

102

See Harrison, supra note 92; Brown, infra note 109.
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[41] Unless a sophisticated balance is struck, the SEC regulations may
either give up enforcement of important investor protections or undermine
the fundamental point of the law.104 The SEC also recognized the nature
of its task. In the notice of its proposed rules under the CROWDFUND
Act, it noted, “[r]ules that are unduly burdensome could discourage
participation in crowdfunding. Rules that are too permissive, however,
may increase the risks for individual investors, thereby undermining the
facilitation of capital raising for startups and small businesses.”105
[42] Professor C. Steven Bradford concludes that “[t]he only totally
effective solution would be to establish a central recordkeeping system
and require intermediaries to report every . . . purchase.”106 He notes,
however, that “a system like that would be expensive [and s]elf-reporting .
. . may be the only cost-effective method.”107 The implementation of a
centralized collection and monitoring system would also have to be
assigned to some governmental or private entity. 108 Finally, deciding to
centralize monitoring activities does not dictate what information is
necessary to effectively monitor. As a result, we would still have to
103

158 Cong. Rec. S5475 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26pt1-PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN.
104

See Bradford, supra note 1, at 8 (“The devil is in the details. Crafting a crowdfunding
exemption [to securities law] requires a careful balancing of investor protection and
capital formation.”).
105

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,430 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249).
106

Bradford, supra note 2, at 202.

107

Id. But see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60 (“Modern information technology may
make it possible to enforce the cap at very low cost, even across different crowdfunding
platforms.”).
108

See Farnkoff, supra note 86, at 177 (“Such a centralized system could ideally be
created and staffed by either the Commission itself or some (sole) third party verification
service with the blessing of the SEC.”).
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decide what investors should disclose to intermediaries to allow a central
monitoring authority to ensure that they remain within their unique
investment boundaries.
[43] Other observers have also proposed alternatives to—or variations
of—the extreme regulatory options discussed above (i.e., self-verification
and intensive disclosures). For example, relying on statements by Senator
Merkley, Professor J. Robert Brown suggests that self-certification of
income and net worth could be used when investment amounts are low. 109
Professor Brown acknowledges that this would not prevent investors from
providing false information, or eliminate the information gap among
intermediaries.110 He does note, however, that “the modest nature of the
amounts is consistent with the idea of crowdfunding, minimizes the
possibility that investors will risk a significant amount in a single offering,
and reduces the incentives of third parties to provide false information to
intermediaries on behalf of these investors.”111
[44] Professor Brown has also discussed the possibility of asking for
more personal information than a mere statement of income and/or net
worth, while stopping short of disclosing sensitive documents.112 For
example, he proposed empowering intermediaries to “require disclosure of
the material sources of income and the amount attributed to each.”113
Alternatively, “investors could be asked about the source of the funds that
would be used in the offering.”114 Going further, heightened scrutiny by
109

See Memorandum from J. Robert Brown, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. of Denver
Sturm Coll. of Law, on Crowdfunding, Exchange Act Release No. 70741 6 (Jan. 27,
2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-148.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/4UN2-F77W.
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See id.
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Id.
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Id. at 7.
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Id.
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the intermediaries could complement the additional disclosures.
Specifically, “intermediaries should have at least some obligation to
engage in ‘spot checks’ of income and net worth,” and “more meaningful
guidance on . . . when information would be deemed unreliable.”115
[45] The sum of slightly more disclosure and slightly more oversight
might significantly improve the enforcement of the investment caps. It is
unlikely to prevent investors from exceeding their statutory limits,
particularly without centralized control over the information they are
required to provide. Perfection, however, should not be the enemy of
good. Some investors will exceed their investment limits no matter how
the SEC structures its rules. The appropriate question should probably be
whether an increased enforcement level justifies the additional time,
expense and trouble it imposes on investors, intermediaries and the
government.116
[46] The Cornell Securities Law Clinic suggested specifying the
information that intermediaries must collect in order to enforce the
investment caps.117 Doing so would provide intermediaries with a degree
of regulatory certainty while “prevent[ing] intermediaries from using an
unintended interpretation of an ambiguous standard to justify their failure
to collect information that would require them to prevent investors from
being involved in an offering.”118 In other words, it serves the potentially
competing interests of promoting efficiency and investor protection. At
the very least, the Cornell Clinic supported requiring the collection of
“identifying information to prevent duplicate or fraudulent accounts as
well as information regarding other intermediary accounts and
investments.”119 Unfortunately, this does not help identify what specific
115

Brown, supra note 109, at 7.

116

See Jacobson, supra note 66, at 1–2.
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See id. at 10.
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information that might include. Furthermore, while this information might
prevent investors from exceeding their individual limits across multiple
platforms, it would not establish what those respective limits are in the
first place. Disclosing personal information up to bank accounts and tax
returns would still be necessary.
[47] Lastly, William F. Galvin—Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts—encouraged the SEC to provide for fines when
intermediaries fail to satisfy their enforcement responsibilities.120 “For
example, the Commission could impose a fine if it determines that an
intermediary had no reasonable basis for believing that an investor met the
required qualifications.”121 This approach is different from the others in
that it does not focus on the tools and infrastructure intermediaries would
need “to ensure that no investor in a 12-month period has purchased
securities . . . that . . . exceed the investment limits . . . .”122 Instead, it
attempts to adjust the incentives intermediaries have to act diligently.123
Under the proposed regulations, intermediaries have no significant duty to
enforce the investment limits, and real incentives to allow investors to
spend as much as they would like.124 Dangling the threat of fines might
encourage intermediaries to pay attention to information provided by
investors when they would otherwise turn a blind eye.125
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See, e.g., Letter from William F. Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Feb. 3, 2014), available at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-213.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/5A6J-LYF8.
121

Id.

122

15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012).
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See Galvin, supra note 120, at 5.
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3. Information Security
[48] The SEC must also decide how crowdfunding intermediaries
handle the personal information they do collect. The SEC has some
experience with security issues, so it may not be completely unequipped to
address this issue. At the same time, the SEC’s staff devoted to privacy
issues appears small,126 and the Commission’s experience is limited
relative to other federal agencies like the Federal Trade Commission.
Finally, the entities the SEC will be regulating in the crowdfunding
context will probably differ greatly from those it currently regulates,
which could further limit the value of its current experience. As a result,
the SEC should seriously consider the applicability of its current rules to
crowdfunding and create a new set of security regulations for these
intermediaries that restrict the ways they can use investors’ personal
information.
a. Regulation S-P
[49] SEC Regulation S-P implements the Commission’s privacy and
security policies by limiting the “nonpublic personal information” a
financial institution under the SEC’s regulatory purview may disclose to
third parties.127 For example, entities subject to Regulation S-P may not
disclose nonpublic personal information to any nonaffiliated third party
without first: (1) giving the individual notice of its policies; (2) providing
the individual with “a clear and conspicuous notice” that the institution
may disclose their information; and (3) giving the individual an

126

See About Privacy at the SEC, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/privacy/secprivacyoffice.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/Z5JL-9U5N (last modified Mar. 13, 2013) (listing four staffers as
contacts).
127

17 C.F.R. § 248.1(a) (2014) (noting this regulation applies to all financial institutions
subject to SEC regulations beyond simply the crowdfunding context).
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opportunity to opt out, and (4) instructions how to opt out of any such
disclosures.128
[50] The SEC also requires institutions under its control “to adopt
appropriate policies and procedures that address safeguards to protect this
information” pursuant to Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.129
Specifically, those policies:
[M]ust be reasonably designed to:
(1) Insure the security and confidentiality of customer
records and information;
(2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of customer records and information;
and
(3) Protect against unauthorized access to or use of
customer records or information that could result in
substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.130
In effect, there are no concrete requirements. Instead, the SEC passes the
responsibility of setting those requirements to the regulated entities that
have to live by them.
b. Regulation S-ID
[51] SEC Regulation S-ID aims to prevent identity theft. In general, the
rule “requires brokers to develop and implement a written identity theft
prevention program that is designed to detect, prevent and mitigate
128

Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 40,334,
40,351 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-06-29/pdf/00-16269.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/2JJ5-F8KP.
129

Id. at 40,334.

130

17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a) (2014).
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identity theft in connection with certain existing accounts or the opening
of new accounts.”131
[52] Here again, the SEC allows the regulated entities to “develop”
their own “identity theft prevention program[s],” but requires “each
Program be appropriate to the size and complexity of the financial
institution or creditor and the nature and scope of its activities.”132
Regulation S-ID goes slightly further and requires each “Program [to]
include reasonable policies and procedures to: (i) Identify relevant Red
Flags . . . and incorporate those Red Flags . . . ; (ii) Detect Red Flags that
have been incorporated into the Program . . . ; (iii) Respond appropriately
to any Red Flags that are detected . . . ; and (iv) Ensure the Program . . . is
updated periodically . . . .”133 Lastly, each entity must implement its
Program by:
1. Obtaining approval of the initial Program from “its board of
directors or an appropriate committee of the board of
directors;”
2. “Involve [at least] a designated employee at the level of senior
management in the oversight, development, implementation
and administration of the Program;”
3. Adequately train staff “to effectively implement the Program;”
and

131

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,493 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249); see also Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, 78
Fed. Reg. 23,638, 23,638 (Apr. 19, 2013) (17 C.F.R. pt. 248) (“[T]he rules require
financial institutions and creditors to develop and implement a written identity theft
prevention program designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft in connection
with certain existing accounts or the opening of new accounts.”).
132

Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 23,645.
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17 C.F.R. § 248.201(d)(2)(2014); see also 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(b)(10) (defining “Red
Flag” as “a pattern, practice, or specific activity that indicates the possible existence of
identify theft.”).

33

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

4. Effectively overseeing agreements with the company's service
providers.134
IV. PROPOSED SEC REGULATIONS AND PERSONAL INFORMATION
[53] The SEC proposed regulations implementing the CROWDFUND
Act on October 23, 2013. The proposed rules generally reflect the SEC’s
goal of balancing investor protection with facilitating crowdfunding as a
source of capital.135 In the 585-page document, the SEC addressed what
information investors would have to disclose pursuant to the investment
limits, the information intermediaries would have to collect to prevent
crimes like money laundering and financing of terrorism and the
safeguards intermediaries would have to impose to protect the personal
information they collect.136 This section discusses the collection, handling,
and protection of personal information under the SEC’s proposed rules
implementing Title III of the JOBS Act.
A. Enforcement of Investment Caps
[54] The SEC “recognize[d] that it would be difficult for intermediaries
to monitor or independently verify whether each investor remains within
his or her investment limits . . . .”137 Having emphasized the JOBS Act’s
134

17 C.F.R. § 248.201(e) (2014).
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See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430 (“Rules that are unduly burdensome
could discourage participation in crowdfunding. Rules that are too permissive, however,
may increase the risks for individual investors, thereby undermining the facilitation of
capital raising for startups and small businesses.”); see also Cheryl Conner, SEC Attempts
‘Balance’ in Equity Crowdfunding Plan, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2013, 9:19 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2013/10/24/sec-attempts-balance-inequity-crowdfunding-plan/, archived at http://perma.cc/Q76G-4QRT.
136

See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,428 & 66,491 (“The [Bank Secrecy Act
(“BSA”)] and its implementing regulations establish the basic framework for [anti-money
laundering] obligations imposed on financial institutions. The BSA is intended to
facilitate the prevention, detection and prosecution of money laundering, terrorist
financing and other financial crimes.”).
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purpose of freeing capital for startups and small businesses, and
recognizing the detrimental effects of significant regulation, the SEC
proposed perhaps the smallest possible disclosure burden on investors.
Under the proposed rules, investors would be allowed to self-report their
income and/or net worth for intermediaries to calculate the applicable
investment limit under the statute.138
[55] As discussed above, the SEC could have easily chosen to require
substantially greater disclosures under the statutory scheme. For example,
the SEC could have required intermediaries to collect: (1) tax returns; (2)
Form W-2s; (3) pay stubs; and/or (4) bank statements from investors and
crosscheck those documents against the income and net worth the investor
reported. Actual enforcement of the investment caps probably requires the
collection of documents related to investors’ income and net worth.
Otherwise, intermediaries are left to rely on word of mouth. Collecting
documents, however, would probably impose additional (and perhaps
costly) recordkeeping obligations on intermediaries to make sure the
sensitive documents are kept safe. It would also impose more work on
intermediaries in the form of verifying investors’ information before
allowing investment.
Many stakeholders, particularly issuers and
intermediaries, have argued that “[i]t is virtually impossible to do income
verification for an individual, and that is why we have to rely on selfdisclosure . . . .”139 In effect, the SEC’s proposed rule reflects the

137

Id. at 66,470.
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See id.; see also Farnkoff, supra note 86, at 168 (noting the regulations “allow for an
issuer to rely on the assurances that its investors provide to the intermediary in order to
retain the exemption, even if the investor misleads the intermediary and exceeds his
income-based or aggregate investment limitations.”).
139

Dave Michaels, SEC to Issue Crowdfunding Proposal Easing Investor Verification,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1017/sec-to-release-crowdfunding-rule-easing-investor-verification.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/SE7S-NGZ7 (quoting Sherwood Neiss, principal at consultant
Crowdfund Capital Advisors).
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reasoning that actual enforcement is unlikely in any event, so why impose
any regulatory burden at all?
B. Crime Prevention
[56] The SEC determined “that funding portals could play a critical role
in detecting, preventing, and reporting money laundering and other illicit
financing, such as market manipulation and fraud.”140 According to the
SEC, “a funding portal . . . is in the best position to ‘know its customers,’
and to identify and monitor for suspicious and potentially illicit activity at
the individual customer level . . . .”141 As a result, “[t]he proposed rules
require that funding portals comply with [preventative requirements
associated with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)].”142
Under these
requirements, funding portals must:
(1) [e]stablish and maintain an effective [anti-money
laundering] program (“AML Program Requirement”);
(2) establish and maintain a Customer Identification
Program (“CIP Requirement”);
(3) monitor for and file reports of suspicious activity (“the
SAR Requirement”); and
(4) comply with requests for information from the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) (the “Section
314(a) Requirements”).143
Of these, the SEC anticipates “that the nature of a funding portal’s
business would typically implicate the AML Program Requirement, the

140

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,490.
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Id.
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Id. at 66,491 (internal citations omitted).

36

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

CIP Requirement, the SAR Requirement and the information sharing
provisions of the Section 314(a) Requirements.”144
[57] Of those, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN”) regulations compromise investor
privacy the most. In fact, those provisions probably require the disclosure
of more personal information than any other part of the crowdfunding
process. Intermediaries’ FinCEN procedures must:
[I]nclude[] procedures for:
(1) [o]btaining customer identifying information from each
customer prior to account opening;
(2) verifying the identity of each customer, to the extent
reasonable and practicable, within a reasonable time before
or after account opening;
(3) making and maintaining a record of obtained
information relating to identity verification;
(4) determining, within a reasonable time after account
opening or earlier, whether a customer appears on any list
of known or suspected terrorist organizations designated by
Treasury; and
(5) providing each customer with adequate notice, prior to
opening an account, that information is being requested to
verify the customer’s identity.145
B. Security
[58] Even after acknowledging that existing regulations might not
address issues crowdfunding raises, the Commission determined “it is
unnecessary to repeat identical, existing requirements, in a separate rule
144

Id.

145

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,492 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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proposal . . . or to propose rules that would apply not only to
crowdfunding, but to a broader set of technology-based activity.”146
Accordingly, the SEC proposed simply extending its existing “Privacy
Rules”—discussed in section II.C.3 above—to funding portals in the
crowdfunding arena.147
V. ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Proposed SEC Regulations Favor Capital Formation
(and Privacy) at the Expense of the Investment Limits
[59] From a normative standpoint, relying on investors’ self-reported
information strikes a good balance between capital formation and investor
protection. This is a “fundamental challenge with any piece of securities
regulation . . . .”148 The chilling effect of regulation on capital formation
could be particularly acute in this instance because increased compliance
costs could quickly outweigh the relatively small amounts being raised.149
The SEC’s approach tends heavily toward facilitating crowdfunding’s
capital-raising potential by declining many of the regulatory burdens the
Commission could have imposed. Investor privacy is also a tangential
beneficiary in that investors will disclose relatively little personal
information before they may invest via crowdfunding platforms. In fact,
privacy-minded investors would not necessarily have to disclose any
personal information. Because the proposed rules do not require any
documentary evidence of income or net worth, investors could simply lie.
In that case, intermediaries would know no more about the individual
investor than they did before any transactions took place. This could also
146

Id. at 66,493 (emphasis added).
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See id. (“Since the capital amounts raised by these offerings will be relatively small,
there is greater risk that transaction costs, like regulatory compliance, will make this
avenue prohibitively expensive.”).
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minimize the potential harm caused by any unintentional disclosures or
improper uses.
[60] Critics of the SEC’s approach can fairly point out that it
fundamentally compromises the investment limits.150
Allowing
intermediaries to rely on investors’ self-reported income and net worth
effectively eliminates the statutory investment caps by making them
impossible to effectively enforce. Without some objective documentation,
investors can quite easily claim grossly inflated amounts in order to invest
greater amounts on an intermediary’s website. According to the SEC,
“[t]he intermediary could not rely on an investor’s representations if the
intermediary had reason to question the reliability of the representation,” 151
but without the disclosure of more information, what would give “the
intermediary . . . reason to question [its] reliability”?152 It is also doubtful
that an intermediary would have much incentive to question an investor’s
representation that allowed the investor to invest more money through its
site. This may very well be the best policy decision, but it is important to
note that it essentially nullifies this “bedrock statutory protection for
crowdfunding investors . . . .”153 While even proponents of a light
regulatory approach argue for “a relatively heavy burden on intermediaries
to enforce [the limits],” the SEC would essentially regulate enforcement
out of the statute.154
[61] The fact that the SEC’s proposed balance so fundamentally
compromises the investment limits could give rise to legal challenges
150

See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 59–60.
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Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470.
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Schwartz, supra note 10, at 59.
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Id. at 60; Thorpe, supra note 37 (explaining that while the SEC requires intermediaries
to take efforts to ensure that investors comply with the investment limits, “[t]he SEC is
rumored to have decided not to enforce this provision.”).
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alleging that it abused its discretion in creating the rules.155 Courts analyze
administrative rules like those the SEC proposed under the two-part
Chevron evaluation.156 First, the Court considers whether Congress
expressly stated how it expected the agency to implement the statute.157
Agencies have to follow Congress’ instruction in that event.158 If the
relevant statute is ambiguous—that is, “Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue”—“the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”159 When Congress tells an agency to take a particular action, the
way the agency does so is “permissible” unless it is somehow “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”160 This standard is highly
deferential to an agency’s interpretation.161 The fundamental question
155

See Seidt, supra note 99, at 1 (“The Commission has no authority to ignore
Congressional mandates, and the Commission’s proposals to circumvent the issuer and
investor investment thresholds, for example, are unauthorized anti-investor propositions
that [the North American Securities Administrators Association] cannot support.”);
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60 (“[E]ven if the cost of effectively enforcing the cap turns
out to be a bit high, it is probably worth it, because the whole statutory scheme depends
on it.”); Farnkoff, supra note 86, at 171 (“A self-certification method to satisfy the
aggregate investment levels, where an intermediary trusts the word of the investors
regarding their investments with other funding portals, arguably does not capture the
spirit of Congress’s inclusion of the word ‘ensure.’”).
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See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).

157

See id. at 842.
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See id. at 842–43.
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Id. at 843.
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Id. at 843–44.
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See City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)
(“Chevron is rooted in a background presumption of congressional intent: namely, ‘that
Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute’ administered by an agency, ‘understood that
the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the
agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.’”) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)).
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under Chevron “is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within
the bounds of its statutory authority.”162
[62] As explained above, the JOBS Act imposed a difficult balancing
act on the SEC.163 Intermediaries must “make such efforts as the [SEC]
determines appropriate, by rule, to ensure that no investor in a 12-month
period has purchased securities . . . that . . . exceed the investment limits . .
. .”164 Accordingly, the SEC is responsible for determining what efforts
are appropriate.165 The statute, however, does not identify any efforts that
would be inappropriate.166 In other words, the statutory language is
ambiguous, and simply defers to the SEC to make the determination.
[63] The SEC exercised its broad discretion and determined that the sort
of disclosures that would facilitate effective enforcement of the investment
limits were not appropriate.167 In doing so, it seems to have relied on the
small, but fundamental, bit of statutory language it could find to guide its
decision. The first line of the JOBS Act describes it as “[a]n Act [t]o
increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access
to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”168 The
investment caps are investor protections “designed to shield [them] from
162
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See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60 (“How exactly to regulate intermediaries’ policing
of the annual cap is a difficult and complex matter that deserves careful attention by the
SEC.”).
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See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249).
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Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
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losses of devastating magnitude.”169
But extensive enforcement
requirements could burden intermediaries and undermine their ability to
facilitate capital formation.170 The SEC might also consider the actual risk
of fraud crowdfunding investors face in determining what measures are
appropriate. Ethan Mollick, a management professor at The Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania, “has done extensive research on
crowdfunding and was consulted by legislators and the SEC on equity
crowdfunding . . . .”171 According to Professor Mollick, “[l]ess than 1% of
funds and 4% of the projects he studied showed signs of fraud.”172
Moreover, the open nature of crowdfunded offerings mitigates against
fraud on its own.173 Low risk and the potential to undermine the statutory
goal probably makes imposing a lighter enforcement burden appropriate.
Given the tension between enforcement of the limits and the JOBS Act’s
overarching objective of facilitating capital investment, as well as the
considerable discretion it received in the statute, the SEC’s proposed rules
probably qualify as a “permissible” construction of the statute.
[64] A number of securities law experts would probably disagree with
that conclusion, however.174
The North American Securities
Administrators Association (“NASAA”) implied that the SEC does not
have the statutory discretion to rely on self-certification.175 Given his view
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170

See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
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The Promise and Perils of Equity Crowdfunding, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 7,
2013), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/promise-perils-equity-crowdfunding/,
archived at http://perma.cc/A5RL-WKE7.
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See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 120, at 5 (“The Commission suggests that the JOBS Act
allows for investor self-monitoring—an entirely untenable position in light of the high
risk and complex nature of investments under the JOBS Act.”).
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that that “the whole statutory scheme depends on [effectively enforcing
the investment limits],” and the obvious enforcement gaps in a selfcertification scheme, Professor Schwartz might rightly conclude that the
SEC’s plan is not “reasonable.”176 Brian Farnkoff looked to the legislative
history and concluded that Senator Merkley—one of the bill’s primary
Senate sponsors—“certainly did not seem to contemplate self-verification
as an option.”177 These individuals might expect courts to reject the SEC’s
proposed regulations as either exceeding the scope of the agency’s
discretion or “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”178
B. The SEC Should be More Proactive Regarding Information
Security
[65] Data security implications are receiving greater scrutiny. On
December 19, 2013, Target announced that “[a]pproximately 40 million
credit and debit card accounts may have been impacted [in a data breach]
between Nov. 27 and Dec. 15, 2013.”179 The breach held the public’s
attention for months as the details got progressively worse. On December
27, 2014, Target “sa[id] . . . ongoing forensics investigation into the data
breach revealed that encrypted debit card PIN information was accessed . .

175

See Seidt, supra note 99, at 1–3 (“[W]e are confused by the Commission’s attempt to
exercise discretion that it does not have to the detriment of investors in . . . critical areas .
. . . It is doubtful that the Commission’s investor self-certification approach will be
sufficient to meet the standard set forth in the statute.”).
176
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http://perma.cc/VVA8-BJNR.
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. .”180 By January 2014, the company estimated that “70 million to 110
million people” had personal information stolen.181 Within a week of the
breach, the market for stolen credit cards spiked dramatically. 182 This, and
other breaches at large corporations, “have sparked concern from U.S.
lawmakers and consumers over who should bear the cost of consumer
losses and how to improve cybersecurity.”183 Intuitively, this becomes
more concerning as the information exposed becomes more personal.
[66] Even though it requires relatively little information from investors
to enforce the JOBS Act’s investment caps, the SEC could still protect
their privacy concerns more effectively. Seizing on the growing visibility
of data breaches, securities regulators seem to have started paying
attention to the issue. In its comments on the SEC’s proposed regulations,
NASAA “urge[d]” the SEC to consider the following:
New Section 4A(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933
requires intermediaries to take such steps to protect investor
privacy as the Commission deems appropriate, and the
proposed rule would require funding portals to comply with
180
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the same privacy rules that are applicable to brokers. Given
the recent breaches in consumer financial data, the
proliferation of identity theft, and the possibility that the
lack of data security may lead to losses far greater than the
amount invested, the proposed privacy requirement is a
critical safeguard for investor data. It will also enhance
the overall integrity of intermediary platforms for the
benefit of issuers.184
As noted above, the SEC proposed essentially extending the privacy
regulations currently applicable to established securities brokers.185 Also
noted above, however, is the fact that crowdfunding intermediaries are not
necessarily comparable to established securities brokers.186 Describing its
proposed recordkeeping requirements on funding portals, the SEC bluntly
stated, “[b]ecause funding portals would be engaged in a more limited
range of activities than brokers and a relatively high proportion of funding
portals would be new market entrants that may not have formal
recordkeeping practices in place, the proposed requirements are relatively
streamlined, compared to those for brokers.”187 This acknowledgement
brings into question the wisdom of applying the Privacy Rules applicable
to brokers to all intermediaries (i.e., including funding portals).
1. Protection of Personal Information Collected
[67] The SEC currently allows brokers to craft their own policies
governing how they use and protect their customers’ personal information
within some broad parameters.188 This approach is designed to provide a
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great deal of flexibility to determine the appropriate policies in light of the
unique considerations of individual brokers.189 It also reduces the
regulatory burden by allowing brokers to bypass more specific regulations
that may not be appropriate for each entity.190 The SEC’s proposed
crowdfunding regulations would generally pass these benefits on to the
emerging funding portals.191 In theory, that would also promote the
growth of the crowdfunding industry as a whole by making it easier for a
great many intermediaries (i.e., “funding portals”) to operate by reducing
the number of absolute requirements with which they have to comply.
[68] The SEC should apply more specific, and perhaps more exacting,
standards to these “new market entrants” lacking “formal recordkeeping
practices in place . . . .”192 At the very least, the SEC should specify
baseline elements that each privacy and data protection program should
include. As the Commission has suggested—if not said explicitly—many
of the crowdfunding intermediaries are young entities with little
experience collecting, holding and protecting consumer information. 193
The proposed rules, however, treat those entities like banks and brokerage
firms even though they may not have the experience and expertise of
banks and brokerage firms.194
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[69] Opponents to greater regulation could make several reasonable
arguments. First, risks to consumer information are inherent in today’s
Internet-centric world. Sony suffered at least seven data breaches on
multiple websites in April and May 2011 alone.195 More recently, in 2013,
Adobe suffered a data breach that “impacted at least 38 million users . . .
.”196 If companies like Adobe and Sony are susceptible, maybe we should
not hamstring crowdfunding’s potential with burdensome protective
measures. But the fact that wealthy, established, sophisticated companies
like Adobe and Sony are vulnerable is all the more reason to require
baseline protective measures by many young, inexperienced companies
that might not have the knowledge or incentives to implement them on
their own initiative.
[70] On a related note, some might argue that people give personal—
including financial—information to web-based businesses every single
day. Why should crowdfunding platforms be subject to unique, additional
requirements? It is equally reasonable, however, to ask whether those
other businesses should be subject to more specific requirements to
safeguard the personal information they collect from customers. But more
specific to the point, as a new and already incredibly diverse industry,
crowdfunding platforms and investors would benefit from some standard
regulation. Intermediaries would receive some sort of baseline guidance
concerning the privacy protections they should implement. Investors
would receive the assurance of some fundamental protection, and the fact
195
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that they are not entering some sort of deregulated investment wasteland.
In fact, skeptics of equity crowdfunding have frequently described it as
“the Wild West of fundraising.”197 In reality, if this new avenue is going
to succeed in creating capital opportunities as its advocates hope, investors
must feel that risks of fraud and privacy breaches are small.198 Some
proactive regulation could promote that interest in crowdfunding’s early
stages.
[71] In some areas of its proposed rules, the SEC seems content to rely
on intermediaries’ interest in “the reputational integrity of its platform and
crowdfunding . . . in general . . .” to essentially self-regulate.199 This alone
probably will not provide effective assurance across the entire
crowdfunding spectrum. Many of the crowdfunding platforms emerging
probably have interests competing with their incentives to provide diligent
privacy protections. Specifically, many would probably rather spend
resources establishing the business than invest in preventing seemingly
speculative security risks. Others might simply underestimate those risks
and decide that they do not merit the expenditure of significant resources.
At the very least, the behavioral impact of these reputational interests are
speculative and should not be relied upon at this early stage of the
crowdfunding industry as an effective replacement for real governmental
oversight.
197

Emily Patterson, Crowdfunding Sites Grapple with Fraud, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU
(June 21, 2013), http://www.bbb.org/blog/2013/06/crowdfunding-sites-grapple-withfraud/, archived at http://perma.cc/69R8-Y7RA.
198

Congress apparently recognized the importance of investor confidence when it passed
the CROWDFUND Act. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S5474 (daily ed. July 26, 2012)
(statement of Sen. Merkley), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-0726/pdf/CREC-2012-07-26-pt1-PgS5474-3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN (
“[i]f crowdfunding is going to take off, this new market needs to inspire confidence in
both investors and small businesses.”); see also Scott Brown, Sen. Scott Brown: Creating
a Nation of Venture Capitalists Through Crowdfunding, WIRED (Nov. 30, 2011, 10:40
AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2011/11/scott-brown-next-steve-jobs/2/, archived
at http://perma.cc/SFE3-YGX2 (“For this new market to flourish, it’s important that
every participant has confidence in the integrity of the system.”).
199

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,463.

48

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

[72] The size of an entity matters when it comes to protecting the
personal information it collects. Smaller entities are frequently more
vulnerable than their larger counterparts. “With limited budgets and few or
no technical experts on staff, small businesses generally have weak
security.”200 Many smaller operations also seem to believe that their lack
of visibility provides protection from security threats. For example, in
2011, the Wall Street Journal interviewed the owner of two magazine
shops in the Chicago area. Hackers “planted a software program on the
cash registers at his . . . shops that sent customer credit-card numbers to
Russia.”201 After the attack, the owner explained, “[w]ho would want to
break into us? . . . [w]e’re not running a bank.”202
[73] Minimal resources combined with naiveté creates a playground for
computer criminals and a major problem concerning the protection of
personal information. Hackers apparently recognize the opportunity, and
“are expanding their sights beyond multinationals to include any business
that stores data in electronic form.”203 Sixty-three percent of the 761 data
breaches the U.S. Secret Service and Verizon forensic analysis unit
responded to in 2010 occurred “at companies with 100 employees or
fewer.”204 According to Visa, “about 95% of the credit-card data breaches
it discovers are on its smallest business customers.”205
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[74] Tech startups are no exception to this problem. Like companies in
other industries, young Internet-based companies have to survive before
they grow, which shapes their priorities.206 With limited resources and
other priorities, data security does not receive the attention that the
companies and their customers would probably prefer.207 This tendency
makes perfect sense. As the owner of a startup, why would you invest in
data security to protect your reputation and customers if the required
investment takes a large chunk out of your profits? “[A]ll too often,
security researchers and analysts say founders’ approach to security is still
simply to pray . . . their company is not hacked, and to ask for forgiveness
if it is.”208
[75] Moreover, like young companies elsewhere, tech startups are
frequently unaware of the threats they face. “Often start-ups can be in
over their heads before they know it.”209 These companies frequently
remain in the dark, even as they collect more personal information,
“rival[ing] what the government itself can collect.”210 Unfortunately, those
“government agencies have no jurisdiction to protect it, or even the ability
to share classified threat information with the companies, leaving the onus
to protect personal data from cybercriminals and nation-states upon the
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companies themselves.”211 That assignment of responsibility leaves
consumers at risk if the companies’ focus lies elsewhere.
[76] Wortham and Perlroth also provide a number of examples that
highlight tech startups’ vulnerability. “Snapchat . . . repeatedly ignored
warnings about a data breach that exposed millions of user names and
phone numbers . . . .”212 Tinder—a dating application that uses a phone’s
location to identify nearby singles—“acknowledged flaws in its software
that would let hackers pinpoint the exact locations of people using the
service.”213 And Kickstarter, one of the most recognized crowdfunding
platforms, “said . . . that hackers had gained access to customer data,
including passwords and phone numbers.”214
[77] We have seen this effect in other areas as well. The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 required the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to perform periodic audits to
ensure covered entities and businesses are complying with the [Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act] Privacy and Security Rules
and Breach Notification Standards.215 The DHHS Office of Civil Rights
released the results of its initial audit in March 2012. The initial audit
results “confirmed” that security violations were the most common, and
211
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“[s]mall covered entities had a lot more issues than large ones.”216
According to QI Partners, a healthcare information consulting firm, “small
organizations are often the easiest target and source of data.”217 These
entities “often lack the resources to know what tools to put in place to
avoid cyber attacks and data breaches.”218
[78] Small businesses are not only more vulnerable to data breaches,
but also suffer disproportionately when they occur. The average cost of a
data breach in the United States is $188 per record.219 This cost can add up
quickly for a small business even with relatively few records in its
possession.220 These businesses also might not “have the financial cushion
to deal with the costs of a breach.”221 A breach can also harm a business’
216
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reputation and cause a loss of customers that small and developing
businesses need to avoid.222 At least some startups recognize “the gravity
of security missteps.”223 “Everyone would acknowledge that one misstep
and you’re toast . . . .”224 Congress and President Obama hoped that equity
crowdfunding could become an engine of capital formation for small
businesses and startups. This will never happen if the companies
facilitating transactions are overly exposed to financially devastating cyber
threats, and investors cannot trust those companies with their personal
information.
2. The SEC Should Restrict How Crowdfunding
Platforms May Use Personal Information
[79] The SEC’s proposed rules would allow intermediaries collecting
personal information from investors to become huge players in the
exploding market for personal information. That market “comprises a
menagerie of advertisers, marketers, ad networks, data brokers, website
publishers, social networks, and online tracking and targeting companies,
for all of which the main currency—what they buy, sell, and trade—is
personal data.”225 “Virtually every piece of personal information that
[individuals] provide online (and much that you provide offline) will end
up being bought and sold, segmented, packaged, analyzed, repackaged,
and sold again.”226 The questions then become whether this phenomenon
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is dangerous or beneficial, and whether crowdfunding intermediaries
should participate?
a. Dangers & Benefits of the Consumer Data
Industry
[80] Consumer advocates are concerned that companies can buy and
sell personal information for inappropriate purposes. For example,
“[p]eople are using data broker information to make important decisions
about the real you based on the virtual you, decisions like your credit
score, your insurance rates, and even whether you get a job.” 227 “[T]his
data is frequently inaccurate,” so people could be unfairly penalized based
on false assumptions.228
[81] Adding new data brokers also compounds existing information
security problems by putting even more personal information at risk. Take
Acxiom for example. Acxiom is a data broker with a “database
contain[ing] information about 500 million active consumers worldwide,
with about 1,500 data points per person.”229 While it controls this huge
catalogue of information, “cybersecurity experts who examined Acxiom’s
Web site for The [New York] Times found basic security lapses on an
online form for consumers seeking access to their own profiles.” 230
Allowing vulnerable companies to buy and sell additional information
puts that additional information at risk. Information inherently becomes
227
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less secure each time it is shared or exchanged because it provides at least
one more point of potential access.
[82] There are potential benefits of this industry. Companies use large
amounts of personal data to “improve the relevance of ads people see on
[sites like] Facebook and the efficacy of marketing campaigns.”231
Proponents argue that consumers “ultimately” benefit because “[t]hey get
to see better, more relevant ads from brands and businesses they care
about and that they have a prior relationship with.”232 Companies are also
willing to pay more for targeted ads based on consumers’ personal
information, which allows sites like Dictionary.com and Facebook to
avoid charging users for access.233
[83] However, consumers are ultimately still paying a price when
companies trade off of their personal information. Many consumers
probably do not view targeted advertisements as some great privilege. To
those consumers, the ads are still simply invitations to spend their hardearned money for the benefit of the advertiser. Moreover, consumers pay
for sites like Facebook and Dictionary.com with at least some autonomy,
as users do not receive any explicit choice between control over their
personal information and access.234
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b. Should Crowdfunding Intermediaries
Participate as Brokers of Personal Information?
[84] The SEC should seize this opportunity to provide crowdfunding
investors greater control over the personal information they disclose to
crowdfunding intermediaries. “[C]onsumers are often unaware of the
existence of data brokers as well as the purposes for which they collect
and use consumers data.”235 In December 2012, “[t]he Federal Trade
Commission issued orders requiring nine data brokerage companies to
provide the agency with information about how they collect and use data
about consumers.”236 The FTC intended to take the information provided
by the companies “to prepare a study and to make recommendations on
whether, and how, the data broker industry could improve its privacy
practices.”237 So, most do not realize this is happening, they do not expect
it to happen and regulators do not fully understand the potential risks.238
Meanwhile, the general public is “accepting more privacy intrusions each
day, sometimes because we don’t realize what we’re giving out, other
times because we don’t feel we have a choice, [and] other times because
the harm of this isolated transaction seems so remote.”239
[85] The White House has echoed many of the FTC’s observations of
the growing data brokerage industry. These entities gather and analyze a
growing amount of personal information about American consumers
without any “direct relationship with the consumers whose information
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they collect.”240 There are also reasons to doubt that this information is
always used in desirable ways.241 “Consumers deserve more transparency
about how their data is shared beyond the entities with which they do
business directly . . . .”242 With this landscape in mind, the SEC should
consider precluding intermediaries from selling, sharing, or otherwise
disclosing investors’ personal information beyond what is absolutely
necessary to facilitate crowdfunding investment. Doing so would limit
disclosures from one significant pool of information, and comport with the
privacy expectations most investors probably have when they interact with
crowdfunding intermediaries. It would also promote the FTC’s goal of
making the data brokerage industry more transparent by giving
crowdfunding investors a concrete understanding of how their information
will, and will not, be shared. Lastly, from a broader perspective, this is an
opportunity to start moving back toward personal control over personal
information, rather than accepting a lack of any control whatsoever as the
norm.
VI. CONCLUSION
[86] Congress passed, and the President signed, the JOBS Act to
facilitate capital formation for emerging businesses that lacked access to
the capital they needed. In doing so, they also called on the SEC to strike
a tricky balancing act between that goal of capital formation and investors’
privacy interests. The SEC’s proposed rules seem to reflect that
fundamental objective by imposing a relatively light regulatory burden on
crowdfunding participants and thereby making their participation easier.
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[87] That approach favors individual privacy interests because investors
may participate by making minimal personal disclosures that do not even
have to be true. At the same time, the proposed rules may compromise
security interests by not requiring any concrete actions by the
intermediaries who collect personal information. The SEC should go
further than rely upon the unproven judgment of hundreds of emerging
businesses with little track record of handling that information. Instead,
specifying—and requiring—some basic threshold collection, handling,
and protective measures is appropriate, particularly at this stage of
crowdfunding’s development.
[88] At this point, equity crowdfunding is a great unknown. Proponents
characterize it as a great, untapped resource of financing that can drive a
wave of small businesses and startups and the job opportunities that go
along with them. Skeptics, on the other hand, portray it as a wild west of
investment where cunning schemesters will dupe, defraud, and abuse
unwitting rube investors. For the optimistic outlook to become a reality,
equity crowdfunding must be credible and reliable. While widespread
fraud would certainly undermine that credibility, data security is another
potential pitfall. Potential investors simply will not participate if the
information they provide is not (or not perceived to be) secure.
Meanwhile, data breaches seem to be growing in number and visibility,
and tech startups—which include all of the hundreds of crowdfunding
platforms—are frequently ill equipped to face the threat. Accordingly, the
SEC should be proactive and require any equity crowdfunding portal to
take certain baseline measures to protect investors’ information. In the
end, the success of this new means of capital formation could depend on
it.
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